

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5656

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

CONSIDERABLE PRESSING, THAT WORDING OF SOVIET OCT. 2 STATEMENT WOULD CARRY OVER IA NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS INTO A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, NEITHER SOMLIN NOR GRINEVSKY WOULD CONFIRM GRAYBEAL'S INTERPRETATION THAT WORDING OF SOVIET OCT. 2 STATEMENT INDICATED A CEILING WITHIN WHICH EITHER SIDE COULD REPLACE ICBM LAUNCHERS. DURING A PARALLEL CONVERSATION ON THE SAME OCCASION, TURSOV, IN RESPONSE TO FITZGERALD'S QUESTION (A-362) SAID THE SOVIET SIDE INTERPRETED ARTICLE I OF THE IA AS A PROHIBITION ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SILOS IN DIFFERENT AREAS FROM PRESENT LOCATIONS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE OCT. 2 FORMULATION WOULD PROHIBIT AS WELL THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SILOS IN NEW AREAS, ALTHOUGH EXISTING SILOS COULD BE MODERNIZED.)

14. SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES. IN RESPONSE TO GRAYBEAL'S QUESTION (A-383) RE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT FORMULATION "SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES" INSTEAD OF "CRUISE MISSILES SPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR STRIKING LAND TARGETS", SMOLIN SAID THAT THE NEW SOVIET FORMULATION TOOK INTO ACCOUNT PREVIOUS EXCHANGES CONCERNING DIFFICULTY OF DETERMINING WHAT A SYSTEM WAS "SPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR" AND WAS INTENDED TO BE A "MORE PRECISE FORMULATION" WITHOUT CHANGING THE ORIGINAL SOVIET INTENT.

15. MRV/MIRVS. SOVIET INTERPRETERS TOLD KRIMER (A-405) THAT U.S. TRANSLATION OF RUSSIAN "RGCH" AS "MRV/MIRVS" REFERRED TO TWO SPECIFIC MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS ALREADY IN

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EXISTENCE. THE SOVIET INTENTION WAS BROADER THAN THAT AND THEY SUGGESTED THAT THE ABBREVIATIONS BE LEFT OUT OF BOTH THE ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN TEXTS WHICH WOULD THEN READ "DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE OF ANY TYPE."

16. MOBILE ICBMS. IN RESPONSE TO FITZGERALD'S OBSERVATION (SCC II, A-85) THAT REFERENCE IN SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE II TO "LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS" MIGHT INDICATE THAT THE USSR WISHED TO RETAIN RIGHT TO DEPLOY LAND-MOBILE ICBMS, USTINOV REACTED VEHEMENTLY, STATING THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT WAS NOT INTENDED TO DO ANYTHING WITH REGARD TO ECBMS AND SLBMS BEYOND THAT WHICH THE SIDES HAD AGREED TO IN THE IA.

17. AIRBORNE PLATFORMS. SOVIET INTERPRETERS RAISED WITH KRIMER (A-405) U.S. TRANSLATION OF "NA VOZDUSHNYKH STARTAKH" AS "AIRBORNE PLATFORMS." THEIR MILITARY EXPERTS WANTED THIS FORMULATION TO BE AS BROAD AS POSSIBLE AND PREFERRED THAT IT BE TRANSLATED AS "AIRBORNE LAUNCHERS." THEY CONFIRMED THAT THE RUSSIAN WORD "START" WAS INTENDED TO MEAN A LAUNCHING DEVICE.

18. LONG-RANGE ASMS. IN RESPONSE TO FITZGERALD'S QUESTION RE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON LONG RANGE ASMS (A-404), BUDANTSEV SAID THAT SOVIET PROPOSAL PERTAINED TO LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE "SRUISE" MISSILES. WHEN FITZGERALD NOTED THAT U.S. HAD SUGGESTED A MAXIMUM RANGE OF 3,000 KILOMETERS FOR ASMS, MAZERKIN SAID SOVIETS DID NOT HAVE THIS RANGE IN MIND SINCE SUCH A RANGE WOULD PERMIT THE U.S. TO STRIKE THE USSR WITH CURISE MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM BOMBERS. MAZERKIN INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF LESS THAN A 2,000 KILOMETER RANGE AND MIGHT EVEN PROPOSE LESS THAN A 1,000 KILOMETER RANGE. HE SAID THE IMPORTANT THING WAS FOR THE SIDES TO BAN ASMS WHICH WOULD PERMIT EITHER SIDE TO STRIKE THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER.

19. FREEDOM-TO-MIX. IN RESPONSE TO ROWNY'S QUESTION RE PROVISION FOR FREEDOM-TO-MIX IN SOVIET DRAFT (A-410), TRUSOV SAID THAT IF US WANTED SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER PROPOSAL, IT WAS UP TO U.S. SIDE TO PUT FORWARD OUR IDEAS IN CONCRETE LANGUAGE.

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20. IN RESERVE. TRUSOV (TO FITZGERALD, A-384) SAID THAT SOVIET TERM "IN RESERVE" DESCRIBES A CONDITION CLOSE TO MOTHBALLING SUCH AS THOSE B-52 BOMBERS WHICH ARE IN A STATE OF STORAGE WHICH IS NOT OF THE SAME LONG-TERM NATURE AS MOTHBALLING. TRUSOV AGREED THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MOTHBALLING AND "IN RESERVE" WAS PROBABLY A SMALL ONE.

21. NUCLEAR AMMUNITION. SOVIET INTERPRETERS TOOK ISSUE WITH KRIMER (A-405) RE U.S. TRANSLATION OF "YARDERNYYE BOYEPRIPASY" AS "NUCLEAR WEAPONS" SINCE THIS MIGHT BE MISREAD BY THE "UNINITIATED" AS INCLUDING DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

22. TESTING. WHEN FITZGERALD ASSERTED THAT PHRASE "TESTING ASSOCIATED WITH THESE ACTIVITIES" IN ARTICLE II (2) OF THE SOVIET DRAFT WAS UNCLEAR, BELETSKY IN THIS CONNECTION SINGLED OUT AS AN EXAMPLE "TESTS ASSOCIATED WITH CONVERSION" (A-396). HE SAID THAT A SYSTEM UNDERGOING CONVERSION TO A NEW SYSTEM WOULD REQUIRE VARIOUS TYPES OF TESTING TO INCLUDE TESTING OF ITS COMPONENTS.

23. EXOTIC SYSTEMS. IN RESPONDING TO FITZGERALD'S STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE XI WOULD PERMIT THE DEPLOYMENT OF "EXOTIC" SYSTEMS UNLESS THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO BAN THEM (A-386), GEN. TRUSOV SAID THAT, EVEN IF THE PRESENT FORMULATION DIFFERED FROM THE AGREED ABM LANGUAGE, THE SOVIET SIDE'S INTENT WAS TO PROVIDE FOR MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON EITHER BANNING OR LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF "EXOTIC SYSTEMS." HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD NOT TAKE MORE THAN 2 OR 3 DAYS TO ARRIVE AT COMMON LANGUAGE.

24. THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHEN FITZGERALD OBSERVED THAT SEMENOV ON OCTOBER 12 HAD REPEATED HIS SEPT. 29 REFERENCE TO THE "PRESENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES" (A-384), TRUSOV
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